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INTRODUCTION
In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court, for
the first time, decided a case involving dilution under the Federal
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1053

BLANKE FORMAT

1054

8/27/03 11:30 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:1053

Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA).2 The Court held that the
language of the FTDA unambiguously required a showing of
actual dilution, rather than a mere likelihood of dilution.3 This
ruling will significantly impact all dilution claims under the FTDA
involving trademark parodies. Part I of this Article will examine
the Moseley decision. Part II will explore the history of trademark
parodies. Part III will discuss the ramifications of Moseley on
future trademark parody cases.
I.

THE MOSELEY CASE

Shortly after Victor and Cathy Moseley opened Victor’s
Secret, a retail store selling lingerie and adult novelties, they
received a request from Victoria’s Secret, a well-known women’s
lingerie retailer, to change the name of their store.4 Victoria’s
Secret asserted that it was likely to cause confusion and dilute the
distinctiveness of the Victoria’s Secret trademark.5 The Moseleys
then changed their store’s name to Victor’s Little Secret.6
Unsatisfied by the variation, Victoria’s Secret sued the Moseleys
for (1) federal trademark infringement, (2) federal unfair
competition, (3) federal trademark dilution under the FTDA, and
(4) trademark infringement and unfair competition under Kentucky
law.7 The district court granted the Moseleys’ motion for
summary judgment on the federal and state infringement and
unfair competition claims, finding that no likelihood of confusion

2

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). In pertinent part, Federal Trademark Dilution Act
[FTDA] provides:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction
against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name,
if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark . . . .
Id. § 1125(c)(1).
3
Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124.
4
See id. at 1119.
5
See id.
6
See id.
7
See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 465 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d,
123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).

BLANKE FORMAT

2003]

8/27/03 11:30 AM

TRADEMARK PROTECTION FOR PARODY

1055

existed between the parties’ marks.8 It granted summary judgment
in favor of Victoria’s Secret, however, on the dilution claim,
finding that the Moseleys’ mark was sufficiently similar to cause
dilution and diluted Victoria’s Secret’s mark by tarnishment.9
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for
Victoria’s Secret on the dilution claim,10 addressing two factors
that had not been discussed by the district court.11 The court noted
that two months after the district court’s decision, the Sixth Circuit
had adopted the Second Circuit’s standards for determining federal
dilution,12 introducing two important considerations: whether
Victoria’s Secret’s mark was distinctive in addition to being
famous,13 and whether the Moseleys’ use of their mark had caused
dilution of the distinctive quality of Victoria’s Secret’s mark.14
Regarding the first issue, the court concluded that the Victoria’s
Secret mark was distinctive and “deserving of a high level of
trademark protection” because it was “‘arbitrary and fanciful.’”15
With respect to the second and more crucial issue, the court
explained that there was a split among the circuits as to whether

8

See id. at 465.
Id.
10
Id. at 477.
11
Id. at 468–71.
12
Id. at 468–69 (noting that in Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 577 (6th Cir.
2000), the Sixth Circuit had adopted the test for determining dilution as set out in
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999)). The Nabisco test requires
five elements: “(1) the senior mark must be famous; (2) it must be distinctive; (3) the
junior use must be a commercial use in commerce; (4) it must begin after the senior mark
has become famous; and (5) it must cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior
mark.” Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215. Rather than relying on the Nabisco test for dilution, the
district court applied a four-factor test for dilution established by the Ninth Circuit in
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). See V Secret
Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 469. The Panavision test requires the plaintiff to prove that
(1) the mark is famous; (2) the defendant is making a commercial use of the
mark in commerce; (3) the defendant’s use began after the mark became
famous; and (4) the defendant’s use of the mark dilutes the quality of the mark
by diminishing the capacity of the mark to identify and distinguish goods and
services.
Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324.
13
V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 469.
14
Id. at 471.
15
Id. at 469 (quoting Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216–17).
9
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proof of actual, present injury was required to state a dilution claim
under the FTDA.16
The Sixth Circuit sought to resolve the two leading and directly
contradictory cases that had addressed the requirement of actual,
present injury.17 In Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development,18 the Fourth
Circuit required proof of actual harm to a trademark for a federal
dilution claim.19 Ringling sought to enjoin Utah Division’s use of
the slogan, “The Greatest Snow on Earth,”20 claiming that it
diluted its famous trademark, “The Greatest Show on Earth.”21
The court held that dilution under the FTDA requires “(1) a
sufficient similarity of marks to evoke in consumers a mental
association of the two that (2) causes (3) actual harm to the senior
marks’ economic value as a product-identifying and advertising
agent.”22 The court acknowledged that requiring proof of actual
harm was more stringent than most state dilution laws, but held its
standard to be consistent with Congress’s intent.23
In the other leading case, the Second Circuit in Nabisco, Inc. v.
PF Brands, Inc.,24 explicitly rejected Ringling Bros. and adopted a
much less stringent standard.25 Pepperidge Farm brought a claim
for dilution against Nabisco for marketing a goldfish-shaped
cracker similar to its “orange, bite-sized, cheddar cheese-flavored,
goldfish-shaped cracker.”26 The court held that a plaintiff could
use circumstantial evidence to infer injury, without having to prove
actual harm: “Plaintiffs are ordinarily free to make their case
through circumstantial evidence that will justify an ultimate
inference of injury. ‘Contextual factors’ have long been used to
16

V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 472.
Id.
18
170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
19
Id. at 453.
20
Id. at 451.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 453.
23
Id. at 458–59. The Fourth Circuit’s actual harm test was subsequently adopted by
the Fifth Circuit in Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670
(5th Cir. 2000).
24
191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
25
Id. at 223–24.
26
Id. at 212.
17
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establish infringement. We see no reason why they should not be
used to prove dilution.”27 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the
Second Circuit’s analysis and adopted the Nabisco standard, thus
permitting a mere inference of likely harm, rather than proof of
actual harm, to sustain a federal dilution claim.28 The court then
concluded that the Moseleys’ use of Victor’s Little Secret was “a
classic instance of dilution by tarnishing (associating the Victoria’s
Secret name with sex toys and lewd coffee mugs) and by blurring
(linking the chain with a single, unauthorized establishment).”29
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to finally resolve
“whether objective proof of actual injury to the economic value of
a famous mark (as opposed to a presumption of harm arising from
a subjective ‘likelihood of dilution’ standard) is a requisite for
relief under the FTDA.”30 The Court discussed the development of
trademark dilution law, from its original inception in a 1927 law
review article,31 to its adoption by more than half of the states,32 to
its incorporation in the federal law in 1996.33 It noted that, in
1988, when major changes were being made to federal trademark
law, an anti-dilution provision had been proposed, but was
ultimately rejected because of concerns that “it might have applied

27

Id. at 224. “Contextual factors” include, but are not limited to, distinctiveness of the
plaintiff’s mark, similarity of the marks, proximity of the products, shared customers and
geographic limitations, and sophistication of consumers. See id. at 217–220.
28
V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 475 (concluding that the Nabisco test “both tracks
the language of the statute and follows more closely Congress’s intent in enacting the
FTDA”).
29
Id. at 477. “Dilution corrodes a trademark by ‘blurring its product identification or
by damaging positive associations that have attached to it.’” Id. at 471 (citing Panavision
Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998)).
30
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1118–19 (2003).
31
Id. at 1122 (discussing Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927)). The terms “dilution” and “anti-dilution” are
used synonymously throughout this Article.
32
Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1123. Massachusetts was the first state to enact an antidilution statute in 1947, followed by Illinois in 1953, and New York and Georgia in 1955.
Keren Levy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Conflict Between Constitutional and
Intellectual Property Interests, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 425, 432 n.47 (2001). By 1996,
when the FTDA was passed, twenty-eight states had enacted anti-dilution statutes. Robert
N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whitling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark
Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 811 (1997).
33
Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1123.
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to expression protected by the First Amendment.”34 When the
FTDA finally was passed in 1996, it included two exceptions
designed to allay the First Amendment concern: “a provision
allowing ‘fair use’ of a registered trademark in comparative
advertising or promotion, and the provision that noncommercial
use of the mark shall not constitute dilution.”35
The Court compared most state anti-dilution statutes, which
refer to both “‘injury to business reputation’” (tarnishment) and
“‘dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trademark’”
(blurring) with the FTDA, which refers to only the latter.36 The
Court emphasized that the state statutes, as well as several other
provisions of the federal trademark law, “repeatedly refer to a
‘likelihood’ of harm rather than to a completed harm.”37 In
contrast, the federal dilution statute provides that injunctive relief
is appropriate only if a use “‘causes dilution of the distinctive
quality’ of the famous mark.”38 The Court held that this distinction
was dispositive.39 The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that
the FTDA’s language “unambiguously requires a showing of
actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution.”40
The Court stated that proof of the consequences of dilution,
such as actual loss of sales or profits, was not required.41 It
discussed the Ringling Bros. case and disagreed to the extent the
Fourth Circuit required such proof.42 The Court, however,
endorsed one aspect of the Ringling Bros. conclusion:
We do agree . . . with that court’s conclusion that, at least
where the marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact that
consumers mentally associate the junior user’s mark with a
famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable
dilution. As the facts of that case demonstrate, such mental
association will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id. at 1122; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1123; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000).
Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124.
Id.
Id. at 1124 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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famous mark to identify the goods of its owner, the
statutory requirement for dilution under the FTDA. For
even though Utah drivers may be reminded of the circus
when they see a license plate referring to the “greatest snow
on earth,” it by no means follows that they will associate
“the greatest show on earth” with skiing or snow sports, or
associate it less strongly or exclusively with the circus.
“Blurring” is not a necessary consequence of mental
association. (Nor, for that matter, is “tarnishing.”)43
Similarly, the Court noted that a consumer who saw an
advertisement for Victor’s Little Secret and thereafter notified
Victoria’s Secret made a “mental association” between the two
retailers, but did not form a different impression of Victoria’s
Secret.44 Although the Court opined that direct evidence of
dilution, such as consumer surveys, might not be necessary if
actual dilution could be reliably proven through circumstantial
evidence, the Court held that there was insufficient evidence in the
record to support summary judgment in favor of Victoria’s Secret
and thus reversed and remanded the case.45
The Moseley decision will have significant ramifications for
any claim made under the federal dilution statute. It will be of
particular importance in trademark parody cases, where the junior
mark is similar, but not identical, to the senior mark. Alleging a
“likelihood” that a trademark parody will dilute the senior mark
will no longer be sufficient to establish a claim under the FTDA.
II.

HISTORY OF TRADEMARK PARODY CASES

Parody is a form of social commentary and criticism that dates
back to ancient Greece.46 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,47
the Court explained that the word “parody” has its root in the
43

Id. at 1124–25.
Id. at 1125.
45
Id.
46
See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1987)
(“Parody is a humorous form of social commentary and literary criticism that dates back
as far as Greek antiquity”).
47
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
44
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Greek parodeia, described as “‘“a song sung alongside
another.”’”48 The Campbell court quoted the Oxford English
Dictionary definition of parody as a composition “‘in which the
characteristic turns of thought and phrase in an author . . . are
imitated in such a way as to make them appear ridiculous.’”49
“Chaucer, Shakespeare, Pope, Voltaire, Fielding, Hemingway and
Faulkner are among the myriad of authors who have written
parodies.”50 Parody is a form of expression that is clearly and
staunchly protected by the First Amendment.51
Trademarks are of relatively recent vintage. While they are
often categorized with copyrights and patents as intellectual
property, they claim a less noble and shorter heritage. Their origin
lies in the Commerce Clause,52 rather than the Intellectual Property
Clause,53 and they date back to 1870, rather than to preConstitution days.54 While the purpose of the copyright and patent
laws is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”55 the
purpose behind the Lanham Act56 is to protect trademark owners
and the public from unfair competition and to prevent consumer
confusion.57
One of the earliest protections afforded trademarks under the
Lanham Act was from infringement—the “use in commerce . . . of
48

Id. at 580 (quoting Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1440 (6th
Cir. 1992) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 768 (15th ed.
1975)), rev’d, 510 U.S. at 569).
49
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 n.13 (quoting 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 247 (2d
ed. 1989)).
50
L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 28.
51
For an excellent discussion of the history and development of the balance between
the First Amendment and copyright law, specifically as it pertains to parody as fair use,
see SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company, 268 F.3d 1257, 1260–65 (11th Cir.
2001) (holding that the novel The Wind Done Gone was entitled to First Amendment
protection as a parody of Gone With the Wind).
52
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
53
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
54
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995) (“Although several
states had earlier enacted legislation to prevent the fraudulent use of trademarks, the first
federal trademark statute was not enacted until 1870.”).
55
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
56
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2000).
57
See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 2 cmt. e (4th ed. 2003).
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a registered mark . . . which . . . is likely to cause confusion.”58
Not surprisingly, the focus of courts in trademark infringement
cases is the “likelihood of confusion” caused by the allegedly
infringing mark. Different tests have been formulated in various
circuits to guide courts in determining whether or not there is an
infringement.59 Unlike copyright and patent laws, which are
primarily federal, trademark law is a combination of both federal
and state law.60 After the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946,61
58

15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
The Second Circuit uses the Polaroid factors to determine likelihood of confusion:
the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the
proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the
gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting
its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the
buyers.
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); see also
Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 339–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(providing a recent application of this test).
The Fifth Circuit uses the “digits of confusion” test, which includes a non-exhaustive
list of factors:
(1) the type of trademark allegedly infringed, (2) the similarity between the two
marks, (3) the similarity of the products or services, (4) the identity of the retail
outlets and purchasers, (5) the identity of the advertising media used, (6) the
defendant’s intent, and (7) any evidence of actual confusion.
Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1998). The Fifth Circuit has
held that confusion resulting from a parody is not an affirmative defense to a trademark
infringement claim but is instead an additional factor that should be considered. Id.; see
also Lyons Partnership v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 388–89 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying
this test).
The Eighth Circuit uses the SquirtCo factors: the strength of the trademark; the
similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks; the competitive proximity of the
parties’ products; the defendant’s intent to confuse the public; evidence of any actual
confusion; and the degree of care exercised by the plaintiff’s potential customers.
SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); see also AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying this test).
The Ninth Circuit uses the Sleekcraft factors:
1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of the marks; 4.
evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. type of goods and
the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7. defendant’s intent
in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Dr. Seuss
Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying this
test).
60
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 57.
61
Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1051–1127 (2000)).
59
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states began enacting anti-dilution statutes.62 These state statutes
generally protected a mark from blurring63 and tarnishment.64 In
1996, the FTDA was enacted65 after several failed attempts to add
anti-dilution provisions to the federal law.66 Significantly, the
purpose behind anti-dilution laws is not to avoid consumer
confusion, but rather, to promote a property-like interest in the
mark itself.67 This deviation from the original purpose of
trademark law is largely responsible for the confused state of law
regarding trademark parodies today, as illustrated by the following
discussion of cases from the past twenty-five years.
A. The Early (Sex) Cases
Four early trademark parody cases involved sex, which often
signals defeat for the defendant parodist.68 Three of the four did,

62

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
Blurring is the gradual loss of distinction of a mark caused by use of the mark by
someone else. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 201 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff’d, 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d
497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 57, § 24:68.
64
Tarnishment is the damaging of the reputation of a mark caused by use of the mark
by someone else. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 507 (“A trademark may be tarnished when it is
‘linked to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory
context,’ with the result that ‘the public will associate the lack of quality or lack of
prestige in the defendant’s goods with the plaintiff’s unrelated goods.’” (quoting Deere &
Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994))); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra
note 57, § 24:69.
65
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)).
66
Klieger, supra note 32, at 833–34.
67
The Supreme Court’s Moseley decision noted the unusual origin of the anti-dilution
statutes:
Unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution
are not the product of common-law development, and are not motivated by an
interest in protecting consumers. The seminal discussion of dilution is found in
Frank Schechter’s 1927 law review article concluding “that the preservation of
the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its
protection.”
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2003) (quoting Schechter,
supra note 31, at 831).
68
Cf. Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs., LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 423
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“‘When the association is essentially a harmless, clean pun, which
merely parodies or pokes fun at the plaintiff’s mark, tarnishment is not likely.’” (quoting
63
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in fact, lose. In the first case, the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders
(hereinafter “Cheerleaders”) sued the distributors of the film
Debbie Does Dallas for trademark infringement and trademark
dilution under New York law.69 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals granted an injunction against the distributors, holding that
the Cheerleaders’ uniform worn (partially) by an actress during
the last twelve minutes of the film would likely result in
confusion.70 The court held that the film did not qualify as a
parody, nor was there any First Amendment doctrine that would
protect the infringement of the Cheerleaders’ trademark.71
In the second case, General Electric (GE) sued a company that
was selling T-shirts and briefs containing GE’s distinctive
monogram style, but with the words “Genital Electric,” for
trademark infringement and trademark dilution under
Massachusetts law.72 In a short six-paragraph opinion containing
little detailed analysis, the district court found a “great probability
of confusion among the general public” and granted an injunction
against the T-shirt company.73
In the third case, after Screw magazine published a cartoon
depicting Pillsbury’s trade characters—”Poppin Fresh” and
“Poppie Fresh”—engaged in a variety of sexual acts, Pillsbury
sued for, among other things, copyright infringement, trademark
infringement, and trademark dilution under Georgia law.74 The
court held that (1) there was no copyright infringement because
defendant’s work was protected as a fair use,75 (2) there was no
trademark infringement because there was no showing of a
likelihood of confusion,76 but that (3) plaintiff was entitled under
Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 57 (D.N.M. 1985), aff’d, 828 F.2d
1482 (10th Cir. 1987))).
69
Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202–03
(2d Cir. 1979).
70
Id. at 204–05.
71
Id. at 205–06.
72
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036, 1036 & n.1 (D.
Mass. 1979).
73
Id. at 1037.
74
Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 125–26 (N.D. Ga.
1981).
75
Id. at 128–32.
76
Id. at 132–34.
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Georgia law to an injunction because there was a likelihood that
the defendant’s work would dilute the distinctive quality of the
plaintiff’s trademarks.77
In the last case, after High Society magazine published a twopage parody entitled L.L. Beam’s Back-to-School-Sex-Catalog that
included pictures of nude models in sexually explicit positions,
L.L. Bean sued for, among other things, trademark infringement
and trademark dilution under Maine law.78 The district court
denied summary judgment to both parties on the trademark
infringement claim, finding that there were factual questions
pertaining to the likelihood of confusion.79 It granted summary
judgment, however, to L.L. Bean on the dilution claim, finding that
the parody had tarnished its trademark by undermining the
goodwill and reputation associated with its mark.80 Citing the
Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders decision, the court also held that
enjoining the publication of the parody on dilution grounds did not
offend the principle of free expression under the First
Amendment.81
The First Circuit, in a ruling that was quite different than the
three earlier cases, reversed the district court’s finding of dilution
and lifted the injunction against High Society.82 Tracing the
history of parody from ancient Greece to modern day, the court
noted the pervasive influence of trademarks on modern culture and
observed that trademarks have become a natural target of
satirists.83 The court noted that the “ridicule conveyed by parody
inevitably conflicts with one of the underlying purposes of the
Maine anti-dilution statute, which is to protect against the
tarnishment of the goodwill and reputation associated with a
particular trademark.”84 The court stated, however, that a
trademark is not property in the ordinary sense, and cannot be used
77

Id. at 135.
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27 (1st Cir. 1987).
79
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1531, 1533–35 (D. Me.
1986), rev’d, 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
80
Id. at 1536–38.
81
Id. at 1537–38.
82
L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 34.
83
Id. at 28.
84
Id.
78
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to quash an unauthorized use of a mark that communicates ideas or
expresses views.85
The court then addressed whether enjoining publication of
defendant’s parody would violate the First Amendment guarantee
of freedom of expression.86 It discussed a number of previous
cases finding trademark dilution, including Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders and General Electric,87 but found them
distinguishable for two reasons:
First, they all involved unauthorized commercial uses of
another’s trademark. Second, none of those cases involved
a defendant using a plaintiff’s trademark as a vehicle for an
editorial or artistic parody. In contrast to the cases cited,
the instant defendant used plaintiff’s mark solely for
noncommercial purposes. Appellant’s parody constitutes an
editorial or artistic, rather than a commercial, use of
plaintiff’s mark. The article was labelled [sic] as “humor”
and “parody” in the magazine’s table of contents.88
The court stated that it offended the Constitution to invoke an antidilution statute as a basis for enjoining the noncommercial use of a
trademark by a defendant engaged in a protected form of
expression.89 The First Circuit noted that parody is often
offensive, but nevertheless “‘deserving of substantial freedom—
both as entertainment and as a form of social and literary
criticism.’”90
In an interesting footnote, the court distinguished the Pillsbury
decision by noting that Pillsbury does not stand for the proposition
that a parody may be enjoined under an anti-dilution statute.91
Because the defendant did not assert parody as a defense to the

85

See id. at 29.
See id. at 30–33.
87
See id. at 31–32.
88
Id. at 32.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 33 (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964)
(protecting the right of Mad magazine to publish parody lyrics to songs)).
91
L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 33 n.5.
86
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dilution claim (but only to the copyright infringement claim), the
Pillsbury court did not consider the issue.92
Lastly, the court stated that trademark parodies, even when
offensive, did convey a message.93 It concluded that “[d]enying
parodists the opportunity to poke fun at symbols and names which
have become woven into the fabric of our daily life, would
constitute a serious curtailment of a protected form of
expression.”94
The L.L. Bean case is important for a number of reasons. First,
one could argue that any of the parodic expressions already
discussed and any that will follow would have been permitted as
protected expression under the court’s analysis. Second, the court
recognized the problems associated with treating a trademark as a
traditional property interest. Third, the court acknowledged that
parody was often offensive and unpopular, but nonetheless entitled
to constitutional protection. Fourth, the court characterized the
defendant’s parodic work as “noncommercial.”95 This will
become extremely important for cases decided under the FTDA
because the FTDA specifically exempts the “[n]oncommercial
use” of a mark.96
B. Other Pre-FTDA Cases
In the years before the FTDA’s enactment, the Second Circuit
handed down several important decisions. In a case that did not
involve trademark parody, but involved freedom of expression,
Ginger Rogers sued the distributor of a film entitled Ginger and
Fred, alleging, among other things, that the use of her name
violated the Lanham Act.97 The court established a balancing test:
the Lanham Act “should be construed to apply to artistic works
only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion

92

Id.
See id. at 34.
94
Id. That message, the court added, “may simply be that business and product images
need not always be taken too seriously . . . .” Id.
95
See id. at 32.
96
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2000).
97
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989).
93
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outweighs the public interest in free expression.”98 The court held
that the film title contained no explicit indication that Rogers had
any involvement with the film and did not mislead consumers into
thinking that the film was about her and Fred Astaire.99
Later the same year, the Second Circuit applied the Rogers
balancing test to works of artistic expression, including parody.100
The defendant, a well-known publishing company, partnered with
Spy magazine to publish a parody of Cliffs Notes called Spy
Notes.101 The cover of Spy Notes used the same distinctive yellow
color as Cliffs Notes’ cover, with black diagonal stripes and black
lettering.102 The front and back covers of the book, however,
contained the phrase “A Satire” nine times, as well as other
indications that Cliffs Notes was not the publisher.103
The court began its analysis with the proposition that parody
was a form of artistic expression, protected by the First
Amendment.104 It recognized the conflict between free speech and
trademark protection:
A parody must convey two simultaneous—and
contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also
that it is not the original and is instead a parody. To the
extent that it does only the former but not the latter, it is not
only a poor parody but also vulnerable under trademark
law, since the customer will be confused.105
Thus, the court concluded that the issue is how to balance the
“competing considerations of allowing artistic expression and

98

Id. at 999.
Id. at 1001–02.
100
See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490,
494–95 (2d Cir. 1989).
101
Id. at 491–92.
102
Id. at 492.
103
Id. Among the other indications of the product’s satirical nature: “[T]he cover of Spy
Notes states prominently in red that it ‘Includes The Spy Novel-O-Matic Fiction-Writing
Device!’ This tool, which a prospective purchaser can inspect simply by opening Spy
Notes, allows the ‘young, world-weary urban author’ to create ‘16,765,056 different plot
possibilities’ by manipulating a card.” Id.
104
Id. at 493.
105
Id. at 494.
99
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preventing consumer confusion.”106 The court extended the
Rogers balancing test to parodies107 and concluded that while the
parody cover of Spy Notes looked very similar to the cover design
of Cliffs Notes, there was only a slight risk of consumer
confusion.108 This risk of confusion, the court added, was
outweighed by the public interest in free expression, especially in a
form of expression that, in order to be effective, had to resemble
the original.109
In another case, New York magazine published a Christmas
issue that parodied the Farmer’s Almanac (hereinafter
“Almanac”).110 New York’s cover was a takeoff on the Almanac,
and its content parodied the homespun, rustic nature of that in the
Almanac.111 The publisher of the Almanac sued the magazine for
trademark infringement and trademark dilution under New York
law.112 The District Court for the Southern District of New York
applied the eight-factor Polaroid test113 and concluded that the
parody cover was clearly recognizable as a joke and did not cause
a significant likelihood of confusion as to its source.114 The court
stated that even if there had been some confusion, it still would not
have found a trademark violation because of the First Amendment
protection of expression.115 In reaching this conclusion, the court
applied the Second Circuit’s test under Rogers to balance the dual
interests of artistic expression and avoiding consumer confusion:
“‘[T]he [Lanham] Act should be construed to apply to artistic
works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer
confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression . . . .’”116

106

Id.
Id. at 494–95.
108
Id. at 495–97.
109
Id. at 497.
110
Yankee Publ’g Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 271 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
111
See id. at 271–72.
112
See id. at 272.
113
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
114
See Yankee Publ’g, 809 F. Supp. at 273–75.
115
See id. at 275.
116
Id. at 276 (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989)).
107
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In yet another case, when Hormel Foods, the maker of SPAM
luncheon meat, learned that a character in an upcoming “Muppet”
film was named Spa’am, it sued Jim Henson Productions for
trademark infringement and trademark dilution, seeking to enjoin
the release of the film and related merchandise.117 The Second
Circuit applied the Polaroid test, and found that “the clarity of
Henson’s parodic intent, the widespread familiarity with Henson’s
Muppet parodies, and the strength of Hormel’s mark, all weigh[ed]
strongly against the likelihood of confusion as to source or
sponsorship between Hormel’s mark and the name ‘Spa’am.’”118
The court further held that because of the strength of the mark, the
lack of negative association, and the clear parodic intent, there was
neither dilution by blurring nor dilution by tarnishment.119
In addition to the Second Circuit, two other circuits also have
decided cases giving great deference to parodies of trademarks. In
one case, the maker of Jordache Jeans sued the maker of a line of
jeans that targeted larger women and carried names such as
“Lardashe,” “Vidal Sowsoon,” and “Calvin Swine” for trademark
infringement and trademark dilution.120
The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s finding that there was no likelihood of
confusion regarding the infringement claim.121 The court held that
intent to parody a trademark does not imply intent to confuse the
public: “[W]here a party chooses a mark as a parody of an existing
mark, the intent is not necessarily to confuse the public but rather
to amuse.”122 With respect to the dilution claim, the court, citing
the L.L. Bean decision, discussed the three grounds upon which a
trademark owner can obtain injunctive relief:
Relief may be granted if: “ There is a likelihood of dilution
due to (1) injury to the value of the mark caused by actual
or potential confusion, (2) diminution in the uniqueness and
individuality of the mark, or (3) injury resulting from use of
117

See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 500–02 (2d Cir.
1996). On appeal to the Second Circuit, Hormel limited its challenge to the
merchandising use. Id. at 500.
118
Id. at 503.
119
See id. at 506–08.
120
See Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1483 (10th Cir. 1987).
121
See id.
122
Id. at 1486.
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the mark in a manner that tarnishes or appropriates the
goodwill and reputation associated with plaintiff’s
mark.”123
Regarding the first ground, the court repeated that there was no
likelihood of confusion between the Jordache and Lardashe
trademarks, as was found with respect to the infringement claim.124
Concerning the second ground, the court upheld the district court’s
ruling that since Lardashe was clearly a parody, the Jordache mark
would not lose it distinctiveness, and that “‘indeed, parody tends to
increase public identification of a plaintiff’s mark with the
plaintiff.’”125 With respect to the third ground, the tarnishment
aspect of dilution, the court noted that the “tension between the
first amendment and trademark rights is most acute when a
noncommercial parody is alleged to have caused tarnishment, a
situation in which first amendment protection is greatest.”126 It
agreed with the district court that while some people might find the
Lardashe mark in poor taste, “‘it is not likely to create in the mind
of consumers a particularly unwholesome, unsavory, or degrading
association with plaintiff’s name and marks.’”127 The court
concluded that there can be no likelihood of injury of business
reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trademark “if
the public does not associate a product bearing one trademark with
the manufacturer of a product bearing a different trademark.”128
The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue when Anheuser-Busch
sued a distributor of T-shirts that bore parodies of some of its
trademarks.129 The T-shirt at issue displayed a logo that read
“King of Beaches” instead of “King of Beers.”130 It also replaced
“This Bud’s for You” with “This Beach is for You,”131 as well as
123

Id. at 1489 (quoting L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st
Cir. 1987)).
124
See id.
125
Id. at 1490 (quoting Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd, 625 F. Supp. 48, 57
(D.N.M. 1985), aff’d, 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987)).
126
Id. at 1490 n.7.
127
Id. at 1490 (quoting Jordache, 625 F. Supp. at 57).
128
Id. at 1491.
129
See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 317 (4th Cir. 1992).
130
Id. at 319.
131
Id.
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substituting “Brewed by our original process from the Choicest
Hops, Rice and Best Barley Malt” with “Myrtle Beach contains the
Choicest Surf, Sun and Sand.”132 The trial court jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendant, finding no likelihood of
confusion, but the judge entered a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.133 The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding sufficient evidence
to support the jury verdict:
The statutory standard for infringement does not depend on
how closely a fragment of a given use duplicates the
trademark, but on whether the use in its entirety creates a
likelihood of confusion. In making that determination, we
must examine the allegedly infringing use in the context in
which it is seen by the ordinary consumer; we must look
not only at the portion of the T-shirt that duplicates the
Budweiser label design, but at the T-shirt as a whole as sold
in the marketplace.134
The court stated that a reasonable jury could have determined that
the T-shirts were readily recognizable as parody, and that such a
finding would have provided additional support for the jury’s
verdict.135 The court noted that because it had already decided to
reinstate the jury’s verdict, it was unnecessary to address
defendant’s contention that the First Amendment provided an
additional basis for ruling in its favor.136
The results in the Eighth Circuit differ from those in the
Second, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits. In one Eighth Circuit case,
graphic artist Franklyn Novak produced a design for a T-shirt that
resembled the Mutual of Omaha “Indian head” logo.137 The Tshirt design at issue contained a side view of a feather-bonneted,
emaciated human head with the words “Mutant of Omaha” and
“Nuclear Holocaust Insurance.”138 Mutual of Omaha brought suit
132

Id.
See id. at 318.
134
Id. at 319.
135
See id. at 320–21.
136
See id. at 321 n.2.
137
See Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 907–08 (D. Neb. 1986),
aff’d, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
138
Id.
133
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to enjoin the sale of the shirts.139 The district court applied the
SquirtCo factors140 and found that viewers of the design might
falsely assume that Mutual of Omaha actually had endorsed the Tshirts.141 The Eighth Circuit upheld the ruling of the district
court.142 It feebly attempted to distinguish the case from L.L.
Bean, stating that L.L. Bean had involved “‘editorial or artistic’ use
of a mark ‘solely for noncommercial purposes,’” and that L.L.
Bean had not addressed the likelihood of confusion standard.143
A few years later, the Eighth Circuit again found in favor of the
trademark holder in a dilution claim involving a parody.144
Snicker, a humor magazine, published a mock advertisement of the
fictitious product “Michelob Oily” on its back cover.145 The
advertisement featured a number of Anheuser-Busch logos and
trademarks amidst an oily mess in a river.146 The publisher
claimed that the parody reflected a recent oil spill in the Gasconade
River, a source of Anheuser-Busch’s supply water, and AnheuserBusch’s subsequent decision to temporarily shut down its St. Louis
plant.147 The district court found for the defendants, finding no
likelihood of confusion on the trademark infringement claim,148
and no “threat of tarnishment through association” because
defendant’s use of plaintiff’s marks occurred in an editorial
context.149 The district court discussed the L.L. Bean and Cliff
Notes decisions extensively and favorably.150 The Eighth Circuit
reversed on both counts. With respect to infringement, the court
reviewed the SquirtCo factors,151 and found that there was a
139

Id. at 906–07.
See SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980).
141
See Mut. of Omaha, 648 F. Supp. at 911.
142
See Mut. of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 397.
143
Id. at 403 n.9 (quoting L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st
Cir. 1987)).
144
See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 773 (8th Cir. 1994).
145
Id. at 771–72.
146
Id. at 772.
147
Id.
148
See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 814 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. Mo.
1993), rev’d, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
149
Id. at 799.
150
Id. at 794–96.
151
See SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980).
140
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likelihood of confusion because there was a “distinct
possibility . . . ‘that a superficial observer might believe that the ad
parody was approved by Anheuser-Busch.’”152 It held that the
First Amendment did not bar the application of the Lanham Act in
this case because the defendant’s ad “was likely to confuse
consumers as to its origin, sponsorship or approval.”153
On the dilution claim, the court distinguished the case from
L.L. Bean.154 It noted that the parody in L.L. Bean did not make
derogatory comments about L.L. Bean’s product even though it
contained nude models using fictitious products in sexually explicit
manners.155 In comparison, the Snicker parody attacked the quality
of Anheuser-Busch’s products.156 Furthermore, the court noted
that the parody in L.L. Bean was contained inside the magazine,
rather than on the back cover, where “the casual viewer might fail
to appreciate its editorial purpose.”157
Clearly, one cannot reconcile the decisions of the Second,
Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. If the cases from the Eighth
Circuit had been brought before the Second, Fourth, or Tenth
Circuits (or vice versa), the results would have been the reverse.
This is best illustrated by the strong dissent in the Mutual of
Omaha case:
[T]he majority’s holding sanctions a violation of Novak’s
first amendment rights. The T-shirts simply expressed a
political message which irritated the officers of Mutual,
who decided to swat this pesky fly buzzing around in their
backyard with a sledge hammer (a federal court injunction).
We should not be a party to this effort.158

152

See Balducci, 28 F.3d at 775 (quoting Balducci, 814 F. Supp. at 797).
Balducci, 28 F.3d at 776.
154
Id. at 778.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1987) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting).
153
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C. Post-FTDA Cases Finding No Dilution
When the FTDA was introduced in the Senate, Senator Orrin
Hatch voiced his concerns about the First Amendment and parody
and the proposed dilution bill:
The proposal adequately addresses legitimate first
amendment concerns espoused by the broadcasting industry
and the media. The bill will not prohibit or threaten
noncommercial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial
and other forms of expression that are not a part of a
commercial transaction.159
On the House floor, Representative Carlos J. Moorhead made an
identical statement.160
The FTDA permits the owner of a famous mark to seek
injunctive relief against a use that causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark.161 The owner first must prove that the mark is
famous.162 The statute lists eight factors that a court may consider
in making this determination.163 Certain uses of a famous mark are
specifically exempted:

159

141 CONG. REC. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
See 141 CONG. REC. H14318 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Moorhead).
161
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
162
See id. § 1125(c)(1)(A)–(H).
163
See id. The eight factors are:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks’ owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id.
160
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(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in
comparative commercial advertising or promotion to
identify the competing goods or services of the owner
of the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.164
A number of cases that have been decided under the FTDA
align with the statements of Senator Hatch and Representative
Moorhead.165 In one of several cases from the Ninth Circuit, Dr.
Seuss sued Penguin Books to enjoin publication of a parody of the
O.J. Simpson murder trial that adopted Dr. Seuss’s writing style
and emulated the plot of his book, The Cat in the Hat.166 The
district court issued an injunction on both the copyright and
trademark infringement claims.167 With respect to the federal
dilution claim, the district court noted that Senator Hatch defined
the “noncommercial use” exemption168 to include “parody, satire,
editorial and other forms of expression that are not part of a
commercial transaction.”169 The court went on to hold that “the
First Amendment would apply to this use of the trademarks at
issue, and that as an expressive use, this use is exempt from the
reach of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.”170
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction on the
copyright and trademark infringement claims, but did not address
the dilution claim.171 With respect to the trademark infringement
164

Id. § 1125(c)(4)(A)–(C) (emphasis added).
See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1406 (9th Cir.
1997); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
166
See Dr. Seuss, 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1561–62 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394
(9th Cir. 1997).
167
Id. at 1562 (“The finding of a strong likelihood of success on the copyright claim
raises a presumption of irreparable harm. This alone entitles Dr. Seuss to an injunction.
The finding that the trademark claims present serious questions for litigation, coupled
with the finding that the balance of hardships tips markedly in Dr. Seuss’s favor presents
an independent ground for granting an injunction.”).
168
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B).
169
Dr. Seuss, 924 F. Supp. at 1574.
170
Id.
171
Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1406.
165
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claim, the court held that the Ninth Circuit uses the eight-factor
Sleekcraft test172 to analyze the likelihood of confusion.173 It held
further that in a traditional trademark infringement case, a claim of
parody is not a separate defense, but rather a consideration in the
confusion analysis:
Some parodies will constitute an infringement, some will
not. But the cry of “parody!” does not magically fend off
otherwise legitimate claims of trademark infringement or
dilution. There are confusing parodies and non-confusing
parodies. All they have in common is an attempt at humor
through the use of someone else’s trademark. A noninfringing parody is merely amusing, not confusing.174
In a recent case, Lucasfilm sued to enjoin the sale and
distribution of an animated pornographic movie entitled Starballz,
a takeoff on the Star Wars films and properties.175 Lucasfilm
alleged copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and
trademark dilution.176 The District Court for the Northern District
of California denied the motion for injunction on all three
counts.177 With respect to copyright infringement, it held that
Starballz likely would be protected as a parody under copyright
fair use.178 With respect to trademark infringement, the court
noted that parody was not a defense, but instead was relevant to
show that there is little likelihood of confusion.179 Because “the
Star Wars films are so famous[,] . . . it is extremely unlikely that
consumers would believe that Starballz is associated with Star
Wars or Lucasfilm.”180 On the trademark dilution claim, the court
quoted Senator Hatch’s statement and held that trademark dilution
does not apply to the noncommercial use of the mark: “Parody is a

172

See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979).
See Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1404.
174
Id. at 1405 (citation omitted).
175
See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (N.D. Cal.
2002).
176
See id.
177
See id. at 902.
178
See id. at 901.
179
See id.
180
Id.
173
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form of non-commercial, protected speech which is not affected by
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.”181
After Lucasfilm, the Ninth Circuit addressed these issues again
in a case alleging that the Danish singing group Aqua had
committed trademark infringement and dilution by referring to
Mattel’s Barbie trademark in the song Barbie Girl.182 With respect
to trademark infringement, the court held that the Sleekcraft test
“generally strikes a comfortable balance between the trademark
owner’s property rights and the public’s expressive interests.”183
The court recognized that a trademark sometimes becomes an
integral part of our cultural vocabulary and takes on more than a
mere source-identifying function.184 In such a situation, the
trademark owner would not have the right to control every public
use of the term.185 The only way to parody Barbie is by reference
to the trademark itself.186 Significantly, Barbie was indeed the
target of the parody,187 and such speech was entitled to protection
for its expressive value.
181

Id. at 900.
See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 993 (2003).
183
Id. at 900.
184
See id.
185
See id.
186
See id. at 901.
187
See id. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), the Supreme
Court addressed parody and fair use in the copyright context:
For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions, and the heart of
any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some
elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in
part, comments on that author’s works. If, on the contrary, the commentary has
no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which
the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in
working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s
work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the
extent of its commerciality, loom larger. Parody needs to mimic an original to
make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or
collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet
and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.
Id. at 580–81 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Relying on Campbell, the 9th Circuit distinguished the Barbie case from Dr. Seuss:
This case is therefore distinguishable from Dr. Seuss, where we held that the
book The Cat NOT in the Hat! borrowed Dr. Seuss’s trademarks and lyrics to
get attention rather than to mock The Cat in the Hat! The defendant’s use of
182
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The court adopted the Rogers test and acknowledged that
literary titles do not violate the Lanham Act “unless the title has no
artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has
some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the
source or the content of the work.”188 The court affirmed summary
judgment for the defendant, holding that its use of the Barbie
trademark did not infringe the plaintiff’s mark.189 First, the use of
the trademark was clearly relevant to the expression, and second,
there was nothing misleading as to the source of the work, nor any
suggestion that Mattel had sponsored it.190
With respect to trademark dilution, the court found that the
defendant’s use of the mark was dilutive: “To be dilutive, use of
the mark need not bring to mind the junior user alone. The
distinctiveness of the mark is diminished if the mark no longer
brings to mind the senior user alone.”191 The court, however,
carefully examined the three statutory exemptions in the FTDA.192
It discussed that the noncommercial use exemption might, at first
glance, seem to be at odds with the statutory requirement that the
allegedly dilutive mark be a “commercial use in commerce.”193
The court referred to the legislative history of the FTDA and to the
the Dr. Seuss trademarks and copyrighted works had “no critical bearing on the
substance or style of” The Cat in the Hat!, and therefore could not claim First
Amendment protection. Dr. Seuss recognized that, where an artistic work
targets the original and does not merely borrow another’s property to get
attention, First Amendment interests weigh more heavily in the balance.
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901 (citations omitted).
Also, in Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999), the
Second Circuit relied extensively on Campbell in deciding a trademark parody dispute:
The Supreme Court’s parody explication as to copyrights, set forth in the
context of an expressive work, is relevant to trademarks, . . . especially a
trademark parody that endeavors to promote primarily non-expressive products
such as a competing motorcycle repair service. Grottanelli’s mark makes no
comment on Harley’s mark; it simply uses it somewhat humorously to promote
his own products and services, which is not a permitted trademark parody use.
Id. at 813 (citations omitted).
188
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902 (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir.
1989) (footnote omitted)).
189
Id. at 813.
190
See id. at 902.
191
Id. at 904.
192
See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A)–(C) (2000).
193
See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903–04; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
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Hatch and Moorhead statements, in particular, in order to clarify
the intent of the language.194 It also examined language in the
legislative history that suggested that the bill’s sponsors had
“relied on the ‘noncommercial use’ exemption to allay First
Amendment concerns.”195
Thus, the key issue for the court became whether the speech
was commercial or noncommercial.196 The court noted that
although the boundary between the two had not been clearly
delineated, “the ‘core notion of commercial speech’ is that it ‘does
no more than propose a commercial transaction.’”197 If the speech
does more than propose a commercial transaction, it is entitled to
full First Amendment protection.198 The court held that the Barbie
Girl song was not purely commercial speech, and was therefore
fully protected.199 The use of the Barbie trademark in both the
song and the song title were exempted from the FTDA as
noncommercial uses.200
The District Court for the Southern District of New York faced
a similar issue and achieved the same result, but got there by a
different route.201 Charles Atlas sued DC Comics (hereinafter
“DC”) for, among other things, trademark infringement and
trademark dilution over DC’s use of Atlas’s famous sand-in-theface-weakling-turned-hero character, “MAC.”202 DC alleged two
basic defenses: first, that its use of the trademark character was not
194

See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905–06.
Id. at 906.
196
See id.
197
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906 (quoting Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d
1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001)). In Hoffman, a magazine published a digitally altered
photograph of actor Dustin Hoffman in his role in the movie Tootsie wearing a designer
gown and shoes. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1183. The article containing the photograph
served a clearly commercial purpose: “to draw attention to the for-profit magazine in
which it appeared” in order to sell more copies. Id. at 1186. The article was fully
protected under the First Amendment, however, because it included protected expression:
humor and comment. As long as expressive elements are intertwined with a commercial
purpose, the speech is not purely commercial, and therefore fully protected. See id. at
1185.
198
See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906.
199
Id. at 906–07.
200
Id. at 907.
201
See Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
202
See id. at 331–33.
195
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“in commerce,” as defined under trademark law because of the
comic’s expressive nature, and second, that its comic parody was
entitled to First Amendment free speech protection.203
The court rejected the first defense, holding that the Second
Circuit broadly interprets the “in commerce” provision of the
Lanham Act to “reflect ‘Congress’s intent to legislate to the limits
of its authority under the Commerce Clause, rather than to limit the
Lanham Act.’”204 The court said that the appropriate standard was
whether the challenged use was likely to cause confusion.205 With
respect to the second defense, the court held that DC’s work was
clearly entitled to First Amendment protection as an expressive
work.206 The court, however, stated that this interest in free
expression had to be weighed against the interest in avoiding
consumer confusion.207 Thus, the court held that both of DC’s
defenses led to the same place—the familiar Polaroid likelihood of
confusion test.208 The court applied the test and held that the
likelihood of confusion was slim and clearly outweighed by the
public interest in parodic expression.209
It is interesting that the court came to essentially the same
conclusion as the Lucasfilms and Mattel courts, but without using
the “noncommercial use” exemption.210 It is also interesting that
the Second Circuit basically used the same test for both trademark
infringement and trademark dilution, that is, the Cliffs Notes test211
that balances the public interest in free expression against the
public interest in avoiding confusion.212
The same court gave great weight to the protection afforded to
parody by the First Amendment when Tommy Hilfiger sought to
203

Id. at 335.
Id. at 336 (quoting United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand Am. N.Y., Inc.,
128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997)).
205
Id. at 337.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
209
Charles Atlas, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
210
Id. at 336–37.
211
See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490,
497 (2d Cir. 1989).
212
See Charles Atlas, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 336–37.
204
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enjoin the manufacturer of pet perfumes with names like “Tommy
Holedigger,” “CK-9,” “Miss Claybone,” and “White
Dalmations.”213 The court applied the Cliffs Notes balancing test
and stated that it “‘allows greater latitude for works such as
parodies, in which expression, and not commercial exploitation of
another’s trademark, is the primary intent.’”214 With regard to the
possibility of dilution by blurring, the court held that “[g]iven the
nature of the challenged use, then, and the utter lack of evidence
that the selling power of Hilfiger’s marks has been diminished, no
rational trier of fact could conclude that Nature Labs’ pet perfume
is likely to impair the identification of Hilfiger’s marks with its
products.”215 With respect to tarnishment, the court found no
evidence that the plaintiff’s marks would suffer negative
association through the defendant’s use.216 Quoting from the
Jordache decision, the court stated that “‘[w]hen the association is
essentially a harmless, clean pun, which merely parodies or pokes
fun at the plaintiff’s mark, tarnishment is not likely.’”217
The Fifth Circuit has decided two cases involving trademark
infringement and trademark dilution against claims of parody.218
In the first case, Elvis Presley Enterprises (EPE) sued the owner of
the “Velvet Elvis” bar, alleging trademark infringement and
trademark dilution.219 The bar owner claimed that the use of the
Elvis name and images were parodies.220 The district court agreed,
finding no likelihood of confusion with respect to the infringement
claim, and finding neither dilution by blurring nor dilution by
tarnishment.221 The Fifth Circuit reversed on the trademark
infringement claim and remanded the case for entry of an
213

Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 412
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
214
Id. at 414 (quoting Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495).
215
Tommy Hilfiger, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
216
Id. at 442–43.
217
Id. at 423 (quoting Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 57
(D.N.M. 1985), aff’d, 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987)).
218
See Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1999); Elvis Presley Enters.
v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
219
See Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 789 (S.D. Tex. 1996), rev’d,
141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
220
See id. at 789.
221
Id. at 798–800.
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injunction.222 The court held that the appropriate standard was
likelihood of confusion, and applied the “digits of confusion
test.”223 The court further held that parody was not a defense, but
rather was an additional factor that could be considered in the
likelihood of confusion analysis.224
Discussing Campbell’s analysis of parody, the court stated that
“it is clear that a parody derives its need and justification to mimic
the original from its targeting of the original for comment or
ridicule.”225 The court found that defendant’s parody of the
faddish bars of the sixties did not require the use of Elvis’s name
or marks, and that defendant conceded as much.226 The court held:
Without the necessity to use Elvis’s name, parody does not
weigh against a likelihood of confusion in relation to EPE’s
marks. It is simply irrelevant. As an irrelevant factor,
parody does not weigh against or in favor of a likelihood of
confusion, and the district court erred in relying upon
parody in its determination of the likelihood of
confusion.227
In the other Fifth Circuit case, the owner of the rights to
“Barney” the dinosaur sued the creator of “The Famous Chicken”
(hereinafter “Chicken”) for the latter’s use of Barney in its act.228
The district court granted summary judgment for the Chicken’s
creator on the trademark infringement claim,229 finding no
likelihood of confusion, and on the trademark dilution claim,
222

Elvis Presley, 141 F.3d at 191.
See id. at 194. The Fifth Circuit’s “digits of confusion” test consists of seven
nonexclusive factors that courts should consider in assessing whether a likelihood of
confusion exists. See id. A court is not bound by these factors, however, and is free to
consider other relevant factors in making its determination. Id. The seven factors are: (1)
the type of trademark allegedly infringed, (2) the similarity between the two marks, (3)
the similarity of the products or services, (4) the identity of the retail outlets and
purchasers, (5) the identity of the advertising media used, (6) the defendant’s intent, and
(7) any evidence of actual confusion. Id.
224
Id. at 198.
225
Id. at 199.
226
Id. at 200.
227
Id. (footnote omitted).
228
See Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949 & n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1998),
aff’d, 179 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1999).
229
Id. at 956.
223
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finding no likelihood of blurring or tarnishment.230 The Fifth
Circuit upheld the decision, but addressed only the trademark
infringement claim in its opinion.231 Not surprisingly, it reaffirmed
its recent holding in Elvis Presley, that the “digits of confusion”
factors should be considered in determining if there is a likelihood
of confusion, and that parody is not an affirmative defense, but
rather an additional factor to be considered.232 The court clarified,
however, that parody should be considered in conjunction with—
rather than separately from—the other “digits of confusion.”233
The court held that the Chicken’s use of Barney was clearly
parodic, and that the humor was about, and directed at, Barney.234
The parodic nature of this use was appropriately considered by the
district court in its determination that there was no likelihood of
confusion, the court concluded.235
D. Post-FTDA Cases Finding Dilution
Three cases have found dilution under the FTDA. In one of the
first cases decided under the new statute, the District Court for the
Northern District of California issued an injunction against the
manufacturer and distributor of T-shirts bearing the name
“Buttwiser.”236 The court, in a short six-paragraph decision, held
that plaintiff had “raised serious questions with respect to whether
defendant’s T-shirts will ‘dilute’ [the plaintiff’s] marks” and
granted injunctive relief under the FTDA.237
In the second case, American Dairy Queen sued New Line
Productions to prevent use of the proposed title Dairy Queens for
one of defendant’s films.238 The movie had nothing to do with
Dairy Queen products, but rather was a satire about beauty
230

Id. at 952–54.
See Lyons, 179 F.3d at 387–90.
232
Id. at 388–90.
233
Id. at 390.
234
Id. at 388.
235
Id. at 390.
236
See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Andy’s Sportswear, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542
(N.D. Cal. 1996).
237
Id. at 1543.
238
See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 728 (D.
Minn. 1998).
231
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pageants in the “dairy country” of rural Minnesota.239 With
respect to infringement, the District Court for the District of
Minnesota found for the plaintiff, holding that it was probable that
consumers would be confused as to the source of the film and
would conclude that defendant had received permission or
endorsement from plaintiff to use the mark.240
Regarding dilution, the court noted that the FTDA exempts
noncommercial use, but held that the proposed title was
“predominantly
commercial
and
marketing-oriented.”241
Discussing the First Amendment, the court cited prior Eighth
Circuit cases Mutual of Omaha242 and Balducci243 as precedent for
enjoining material that included some expressive content.244 The
court referred to the balancing test adopted in Balducci (and
borrowed from Cliffs Notes): “‘“[I]n any case where an expressive
work is alleged to infringe a trademark, it is appropriate to weigh
the public interest in the expression against the public interest in
avoiding consumer confusion.”’”245
The court reviewed the Rogers case,246 which also had
involved a movie title, but distinguished it on the grounds that
Fred and Ginger evoked a reference essential to the film, whereas
Dairy Queens bore no relationship to plaintiff’s product.247 As
such, the court held that there were other ways for the defendant to
name its film without restricting its expressive freedom. The court
concluded that
the balance between the public’s interest in free expression
and its interest in avoiding consumer confusion and
239

Id. at 728–29.
Id. at 732.
241
Id.
242
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb. 1986).
243
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
244
Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 734.
245
Id. (quoting Balducci, 28 F.3d at 776 (quoting Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam
Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494–95 (2d Cir. 1989))).
246
See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989).
247
Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 734. The movie title in Rogers was selected
specifically to “evoke the aura of ‘Fred and Ginger’s’ artistic expression . . . referring
directly to Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers.” Id. In contrast, the Dairy Queens title was
not “designed to evoke or even suggest any relationship to [plaintiff’s] trademarked name
or any of its products.” Id.
240
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trademark dilution tilts in favor of avoiding confusion and
dilution. An injunction here will only effect a minute
restriction on expression, but will do much to avoid
confusion and dilution. Defendant’s First Amendment
interests are fully protected.248
Finally, in what might be the most disturbing of the cases
enjoining the use of an alleged trademark parody under the FTDA,
cartoonist Kieron Dwyer created a parody of Starbucks’s
ubiquitous mermaid logo and posted it to his Web site.249 His logo
changed the name encircling the mermaid from “Starbucks Coffee”
to “Consumer Whore.”250 He also changed the stars to dollar
signs, opened the mermaid’s eyes, placed a cup of coffee in one
hand and a cell phone in the other, and gave her nipples and a
navel ring.251 On his Web site, he advertised T-shirts, bumper
stickers, and a comic book, all carrying the logo.252 He sold about
200 of the T-shirts.253 Starbucks sued Dwyer for, among other
things, copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and
trademark dilution by tarnishment. The District Court for the
Northern District of California issued a preliminary injunction
prohibiting Dwyer from posting the logo to his Web site and
selling any items containing the logo.254 The court found against
Starbucks on two grounds: first, on the copyright infringement
claim because the logo was a permitted fair use as criticism and
comment, and second, on the trademark infringement claim
because the logo was sufficiently distinct to eliminate the
248

Id. at 735. The defendant’s film was released in 1999 under the title Drop Dead
Gorgeous. See A Satirical Salute to America’s Version of “Gorgeous”, USA TODAY,
Feb. 19, 1999, at 3E.
249
See Jennifer Reese, Starbucks: Inside the Coffee Cult, FORTUNE, Dec. 9, 1996, at
190.
250
See Sarah M. Schlosser, The High Price of (Criticizing) Coffee: The Chilling Effect
of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act on Corporate Parody, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 937
(2001) (citing Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Hearing at 2, Starbucks Corp. v. Dwyer, No. 00CV-1499 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Dwyer’s Motion]).
251
See id. (citing Dwyer’s Motion at 2).
252
See id. (citing Dwyer’s Motion at 2).
253
See id. at 937 n.44.
254
See id. at 939–40 (citing Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Starbucks, No. 00CV-1499, at 4 (N.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Starbucks Injunction]).
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likelihood of confusion with Starbucks’s logo.255 Despite these
findings, the injunction was granted because the court found the
sale of T-shirts and bumper stickers with the logo to be a dilution
of Starbucks’s trademark.256
Dwyer was unable to fund an appeal for the decision and
entered into a settlement agreement where he agreed not to post the
logo on his Web site or sell any merchandise containing the
logo.257 Given the Ninth Circuit’s relatively sympathetic treatment
of defendants using trademarks for parody, it is noteworthy that
Starbucks was decided in the Northern District of California
because Mattel258 was from the Ninth Circuit and Lucasfilms259
was from the Northern District itself. Because Dwyer was unable
to afford an appeal, however, one can only speculate as to what the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals might have decided.
Unfortunately, this case suggests is that a large corporation like
Starbucks can intimidate smaller defendants.260 Despite that the
district court ruled against Starbucks on the copyright infringement
and trademark infringement claims, Starbucks was able to force a
settlement because of the trademark dilution claim.261
III.

TRADEMARK PARODY AFTER MOSELEY

Moseley holds that before injunctive relief can be granted for
dilution under the FTDA, there must be proof of actual harm,
rather than merely a “likelihood” of harm.262 This change will
have drastic ramifications for any trademark parody claim. Table
1 summarizes most of the cases discussed in this Article. In almost
all of the cases where the allegedly infringing or dilutive use was

255

See id. at 940 (citing Starbucks Injunction at 5).
See id. at 940 (citing Starbucks Injunction at 3–5).
257
See id. at 940–41 (citing Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice due to
Settlement, Starbucks, No. 00-CV-1499).
258
See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
259
See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Cal.
2002).
260
See Schlosser, supra note 250, at 941.
261
See id.
262
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (2003).
256
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not permitted by the court, the result would be different under
Moseley.
In Pillsbury263 and Starbucks,264 for example, the courts found
enough protected expressive content to reject copyright
infringement claims on the basis of fair use. Those courts also
rejected trademark infringement claims because there was no
likelihood of confusion. Both courts upheld dilution claims,
however, because of a “likelihood” of blurring or tarnishment.
Moseley now requires proof of actual harm before injunctive relief
can be granted under the FTDA.265
Similarly, the General Electric and Andy’s Sportswear courts
granted injunctions based on a “great probability”266 of confusion
and because of “serious questions”267 about dilution. Moseley
requires more. The courts in Balducci268 and Dairy Queen269 also
upheld dilution claims upon showings of mere “likelihood”;
however, as discussed below, other issues might still support a
finding of dilution in those cases.
While Moseley certainly raises the bar for the holder of a senior
mark, it does not give carte blanche to every junior mark. Several
questions must still be answered favorably for the junior mark to
be a protected parody.
A. Is the Junior Mark a Parody?
While this first question may seem obvious, two important
issues are raised. First, the junior mark must be a parody. A mark
cannot simply be used without any parodic intent. For example, in
Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, the use of the trademark was
primarily for purposes of familiarity and notoriety, with little or no
263

See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 128–32 (N.D.
Ga. 1981).
264
See supra notes 250–257 and accompanying text.
265
Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124.
266
See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036, 1037 (D. Mass.
1979).
267
See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Andy’s Sportswear, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542,
1543 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
268
See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 1994).
269
See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (D.
Minn. 1998).

BLANKE FORMAT

1088

8/27/03 11:30 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:1053

attempt at parody.270 The result in that case would probably be the
same today.
Also, the use of the trademark must be as parody, rather than as
satire, as described by the Supreme Court in Campbell,271 and
subsequently by the courts in Dr. Seuss,272 Harley-Davidson,273
and Mattel.274 For a parody to be a protected trademark, it must
poke fun at, or comment on, the original. That is the main reason
why Mattel upheld the use of the “Barbie” trademark in the title
and lyrics of the song “Barbie Girl,” and why Dairy Queen
rejected the use of the “Dairy Queen” trademark in the movie title.
The former poked fun at and commented on the trademark, while
the latter did not. Similarly, in Elvis Presley,275 the court held that
the alleged parody was of little weight because it did not target
Elvis Presley.
B. Is the Junior Mark Identical or Very Similar to the Senior
Mark?
The Cliffs Notes court affirmed one of the basic premises of
trademark parody:
A parody must convey two simultaneous—and
contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also
that it is not the original and is instead a parody. To the
extent that it does only the former but not the latter, it is not
only a poor parody but also vulnerable under trademark
law, since the customer will be confused.276

270

See Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205–
06 (2d Cir. 1979).
271
For a brief description of Cambell’s view on copyright parody and fair use, see supra
text accompanying note 187.
272
See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1574 (S.D.
Cal. 1996), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997).
273
See Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999); supra
text accompanying note 187.
274
See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002); supra text
accompanying note 187.
275
See Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 200 (5th Cir. 1998).
276
Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494
(2d Cir. 1989).
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If a junior mark is identical or very similar to a senior mark, the
intent of the parody may be lost or so obscured as to render the use
confusing. For example, Michael Doughney registered the domain
name peta.org and created a Web site called “People Eating Tasty
Animals.”277 The organization People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (PETA) sued Doughney for, among other things, service
mark infringement and dilution.278 Doughney claimed parody as a
defense.279 The court rejected this defense, finding that there was
no suggestion of parody because the domain name itself did not
convey the second of the two simultaneous and contradictory
messages required: that it has no relation to PETA and it is a
parody.280 Only after seeing the Web site might one know that it
was not associated with PETA.281 In a situation like this, the
alleged parody is really not a parody at all, and traditional
trademark infringement analysis, i.e., “likelihood of confusion,”
and trademark dilution analysis after Moseley, i.e., “actual harm,”
would be appropriate.
Another example of this kind of analysis is found in Dairy
Queen. The allegedly infringing mark, the movie title Dairy
Queens, was very similar to the original, adding only an “s” to
it.282Because there was no protected expressive content associated
with the title (nor in the film itself), parody provided no weight to
the public interest side of the balancing test.283 While Moseley will
certainly affect dilution claims, a traditional “likelihood of
confusion” analysis will still be appropriate for infringement
claims.

277

See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 362–63
(4th Cir. 2001).
278
Id. at 363.
279
Id.
280
See id. at 366–67.
281
See id.
282
See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 731 (D.
Minn 1998).
283
See id. at 735 (demonstrating the balance between public interest and avoidance of
public confusion with dilution tilted in favor of the latter).
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C. Is the Use of the Mark Commercial or Noncommercial?
The Mattel court explored in great detail the apparent
conundrum caused by the FTDA’s requirement for a “commercial
use in commerce,” but then exempting a “noncommercial use.”284
The court found an explanation in the legislative history.285
Sponsors of the FTDA in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives, in response to First Amendment concerns, stated
that the proposed law “will not prohibit or threaten noncommercial
expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and other forms of
expression that are not a part of a commercial transaction.”286 The
court held that as long as “speech is not ‘purely commercial’—that
is, if it does more than merely propose a commercial transaction—
then it is entitled to full First Amendment protection.”287 The court
acknowledged that the song title containing the “Barbie” trademark
was certainly used to sell copies of the song, but that since it was
not “purely commercial” and, therefore, entitled to full protection,
it fell within the noncommercial use exception of the FTDA.288
Courts in the Ninth Circuit had previously made similar findings in
Dr. Seuss289 and Lucasfilms.290
In L.L. Bean, a pre-FTDA case, the First Circuit held that the
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark in a catalog parody was
“solely for noncommercial purposes” and was “an editorial or
artistic, rather than a commercial, use.”291 In Dairy Queen,
however, the court found that the defendant’s use of its trademark
in a movie title had a “highly commercial aspect”292 and, citing for

284

See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002).
See id. at 905–06.
286
Id. at 905 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S919310 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) and 141 CONG. REC. H14318 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Moorhead)).
287
Id. at 906.
288
Id. at 906–907.
289
See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1574 (S.D.
Cal. 1996), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
290
See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900 (N.D. Cal.
2002).
291
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987).
292
Am. Dairy Queen Corp v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (D. Minn.
1998).
285
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support a pre-FTDA, Eighth Circuit case, Mutual of Omaha,293
found the title to be “predominantly commercial and marketingoriented.”294 Because the Dairy Queen decision would probably
be upheld on other grounds anyway, it will be interesting to see
how an Eighth Circuit court will interpret the noncommercial
exception.
In Starbucks, the District Court for the Northern District of
California held that since defendant sold T-shirts and coffee mugs
containing the trademark parody, it was a commercial use, despite
the obvious editorial nature contained therein.295 In Lucasfilms,
the same court examined the legislative history of the FTDA as it
pertained to this exception and held that “[p]arody is a form of
non-commercial, protected speech which is not affected by the
[FTDA].”296 Thus, it appears that the Starbucks case would have a
very different outcome today. Even in the Eighth Circuit, there
appears to be enough expressive content to have fallen within the
noncommercial use exception.
D. Is There a Likelihood of Confusion?
While Moseley’s requirement of proof of actual harm will
make it much more difficult to win a dilution case involving
trademark parody, an infringement case can still succeed as long as
it can be shown that there is a likelihood of confusion. While most
courts have found no likelihood of confusion where there is an
obvious parody, a few cases warrant discussion. General Electric
found a “great probability of confusion” as to the use of a “Genital
Electric” mark on T-shirts sold by the defendant.297 Mutual of
Omaha found a likelihood of confusion as to the possible source or
sponsorship of a “Mutant of Omaha” logo on T-shirts and coffee
mugs.298 Balducci also found a likelihood of confusion as to the

293

See Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987).
Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 732.
295
See Schlosser, supra note 250, at 937 (citing Starbucks Injunction).
296
See Lucasfilm, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
297
See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036, 1037 (D. Mass.
1979).
298
See Mut. of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 403.
294
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possible source or sponsorship of a mock advertisement parodying
Anheuser-Busch’s products as “Michelob Oily.”299
These cases illustrate two things. First, as a district court
recently observed, tarnishment is usually found “only in cases
where a distinctive mark is depicted in an obviously degrading
context, often involving a sexual activity, obscenity, or illegal
activity.”300 And, as previously noted, where there is a “‘harmless,
clean pun, . . . tarnishment is not likely.’”301 So, while many
trademark parody cases involving sex or negative portrayals of a
product have permitted such uses, to some extent this will remain
as a wild card factor.
Second, there appears to be room for a classic split in the
circuits. The General Electric case was decided in 1979 before the
First Circuit’s rather broad pronouncement of protection for
trademark parody in L.L. Bean, and it is likely that the result would
be different today. Both Mutual of Omaha and Balducci come
from the Eighth Circuit, however, where the court seemed to
ignore the obvious humor in the parodies, and find that there was a
likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the
works. It is likely that most other courts would have found no
likelihood of confusion. Even after Moseley, there is nothing that
would change the holdings in these cases. It is quite possible for a
court in the Eighth Circuit, or for that matter a court in any circuit
other than those handing down strong decisions in parody cases, to
find a likelihood of confusion regarding the source or sponsorship
of an alleged trademark parody.
CONCLUSION
Moseley dramatically changes the landscape for trademark
dilution claims under the FTDA. Proof of actual harm, as opposed
to mere likelihood of harm, to the senior mark is now required.
This makes it much harder to enjoin the parodic uses of trademarks
299

See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 771–72 (8th Cir. 1994).
Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 790, 809 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
301
Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 423
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 57
(D.N.M. 1985)), aff’d, 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987)).
300
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as long as there is an obvious parody. Basically, the funnier the
parody, the more likely it will be protected. As long as the parody
conveys the simultaneous and contradictory messages that it is the
mark and is not the mark, it will be difficult to prevent its use
under either dilution or infringement theories. For dilution, it will
be difficult to prove actual harm if there is an obvious parody.
Similarly, the more obvious the parody, the more difficult to prove
a likelihood of confusion.
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